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1. Introduction 
It is commonly held that retraction data, if we accept them, show that assessment relativism 
is to be preferred over non-indexical relativism.1 I will argue that this is not the case. 
Whether retraction data have the suggested probative force depends on substantive ques-
tions about the proper treatment of tense and location. One’s preferred account in these 
domains should determine which form of relativism one prefers. 
I will begin by briefly characterizing non-indexical and assessment relativism (§2). I will 
then present the standard argument for assessment relativism based on retraction data 
(§3). Finally, I will show that whether this argument works crucially depends on one’s views 
on tense and location (§4). 
2. Non-indexical and assessment relativism 
Non-indexical and assessment relativism have been proposed as candidate semantics for a 
number of expressions including deontic and epistemic modals, predicates of personal 
taste, “knows” and more (cf. MacFarlane, 2014). The structural points I will make in this 
article apply equally in all domains. For concreteness, I will focus on predicates of personal 
taste, more specifically, the expression “tasty.” 
Non-indexical and assessment relativists agree that a proper semantics for “tasty” requires 
a notion of truth relative to a circumstance of evaluation that applies to propositions. A cir-
cumstance of evaluation, for them, is a tuple comprising at least a possible world, w, and 
(something like) a standard of taste, s. Let’s use f as a name for the proposition we assert 
when we literally use “Fish sticks are tasty.” Leaving aside other potential parameters of the 
circumstance of evaluation, relativists will say that  
                                                             
1 Two brief notes on terminology: First, non-indexical relativism is also commonly referred to as non-
indexical contextualism. Kölbel is the main proponent of this view. He prefers the label “non-indexical 
relativism” (e.g. Kölbel, 2011: 124n). I am following his usage. I find this usage preferable because I 
think that non-indexical relativism/contextualism and assessment relativism have more in common 
than non-indexical relativism/contextualism and indexical contextualism. The reasons will become 
apparent below. Second, when I speak of assessment relativism, I’ll have in mind what MacFarlane 
also calls truth-value relativism. Thus, I’ll leave so-called content-relativism aside (cf. MacFarlane, 
2014: 72ff). 
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f is true relative to a circumstance of evaluation, <w,s>, iff, at w, fish sticks are tasty 
by the lights of s. 
Non-indexical relativists distinctively hold that we further need a notion of proposition truth 
that is relativized to a context of use. This notion can be defined as follows in terms of the 
suggested notion of truth relative to a circumstance of evaluation (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 89f; 
Ninan, 2016: 441f): 
A proposition p is true at a context of use, C, iff p is true relative to <w(C), s(C)>. 
Here, w(C) is the world of C, and s(C) is the taste standard relevant in C. For simplicity, I will 
equate the taste standard relevant in C with the taste standard that the speaker of C has at 
the time of C. Nothing should depend on this simplification. We might get false results for 
so-called “exocentric uses” (Lasersohn, 2005), but such uses won’t feature in the present 
article.2 Turning back to our proposition f, we thus get that 
f is true at a context of use, C, iff, at the possible world of C, fish sticks are tasty by 
the lights of the taste the speaker of C has at the time of C. 
Assessment relativists distinctively hold that we need a notion of proposition truth that is 
relativized to a context of use and a context of assessment.3 This notion can be defined as 
follows in terms of the suggested notion of truth relative to a circumstance of evaluation (cf. 
MacFarlane, 2014: 90; Ninan, 2016: 443f): 
A proposition p is true as used at a context, C1, and assessed from a context, C2, iff p 
is true relative to <w(C1), s(C2)>. 
Here, w(C1) is the world of C1, and s(C2) is the taste standard relevant in C2. As before, I 
will equate this taste standard with the taste standard that the speaker in C2 has at the point 
in time of C2.4 We now get that 
f is true as used at a context, C1, and assessed from a context, C2, iff, at the possible 
world of C1, fish sticks are tasty by the lights of the taste the speaker in C2 has at the 
time of C2. 
How do we determine which of the theories described is correct? Retraction data suppos-
edly show that assessment relativism has the upper hand (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 108; Kölbel, 
2015; Ninan, 2016: 445). 
3. Retraction data for assessment relativism! 
There are presumably various ways to understand the idea of retraction. Retraction data 
critical for the indicated dispute will be data of the following kind: Suppose I liked fish sticks 
at some point and correspondingly said, “Fish sticks are tasty.” Some time later, I come to 
dislike fish sticks. Someone reminds me, “Didn’t you say that fish-stick were tasty?” In this 
                                                             
2 MacFarlane’s own definition of truth at a context is slightly more complicated than mine because 
he wants to avoid talk of the world of a context of use (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 77). We can ignore this 
issue here though. Everything I say could easily be rephrased in terms of MacFarlane’s more compli-
cated definition. 
3 See MacFarlane, 2014: 89n for helpful discussion on how one may accept this double-relativization 
without making it “notationally salient.” 
4 The considerations from footnote 2 apply too. 
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context, the following response sounds problematic (at least assuming that fish sticks ha-
ven’t changed their taste), 
“I stand by that, but fish-stick aren’t tasty (anymore).” 
A much better response would seem to be, 
“I take that back. Fish sticks aren’t tasty” (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 13f). 
Some authors reject the intuitions here (cf. Raffman, 2016). Some recent studies confirm 
them (cf. Knobe and Yalcin, 2014: Experiment 4 for epistemic modals and Dinges and Zak-
kou, ms: Experiment 3 for predicates of personal taste). In the end, retraction data will have 
to be assessed on a case by case basis for each domain in which one might want to employ 
relativism. This is not the task of the present article. I will take retraction data for granted. 
The question I want to address is whether, if real, they can be used to decide between non-
indexical and assessment relativism. 
It may seem that they can. The assessment relativist can posit the following retraction norm 
to explain the data (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 108): 
(ARRN) One should retract, in a context, C2, one’s assertion that p made in a context, 
C1, if p isn’t true as used at C1 and assessed from C2. 
Let’s refer to the context where I originally said “Fish sticks are tasty” as U and to the later 
context where I assess this claim as A. And let’s continue to use f as a name for the proposi-
tion I assert by means of my utterance in U of “Fish sticks are tasty.” Given the previous 
characterization of assessment relativism, f will be true as used at U and assessed from A iff 
fish sticks are tasty according to the taste standard I have at the time of A (at the possible 
world of U—I’ll take the possible world parameter to be tacitly understood in what follows). 
So since I don’t like fish sticks anymore at the time of A, f will come out untrue as used in U 
and assessed from A. Given (ARRN), this means that my assertion in U should be retracted 
in A. Thus, it will be problematic to say “I stand by that” and much better to say “I take that 
back.” The former assertion violates a norm that the latter observes. 
Non-indexical relativists cannot adopt (ARRN), for in their framework there is no notion of 
truth that is relativized to contexts of use and contexts of assessment. So if there is no other 
plausible norm they can adopt, retraction data yield a strong case for assessment relativism. 
Note here that it is essential in the suggested argument that we focus on responses like “I 
stand by that/I take that back” rather than e.g. “what I said is true/false” or “my assertion is 
correct/incorrect.” For non-indexical and assessment relativism make exactly the same pre-
dictions about the latter responses. Via the disquotational nature of (monadic) truth (cf. 
MacFarlane, 2014: 93), they both predict that what is said must be judged as false in the 
above scenario; via so-called “reflexive” norms of assertion  (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 103f), 
they both predict that the assertion must nevertheless be assessed as correct.5 
                                                             
5 There is a worry that truth-value and correctness judgements shouldn’t come apart in this way. See 
Dinges, 2017 for a possible response. There is a further worry that the indicated predictions about 
truth-value judgements aren’t borne out by the data. See Dinges and Zakkou, ms for how a relativist 
might respond. 
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4. Retraction data for assessment relativism? 
I will evaluate the presented argument for assessment relativism in the remainder of this 
article. To begin with, let me present what I take to be the most promising retraction norm 
for non-indexical relativists. We’ll assess below whether it can ultimately be upheld. 
(NIRRN) One should retract, in a context, C2, one’s assertion that p made in a con-
text, C1, if p isn’t true at C2. 
(NIRRN) straightforwardly predicts the indicated retraction data: According to our defini-
tion of non-indexical relativism, f is true at A iff fish sticks are tasty according to the taste 
standard I have at the time of A. This condition doesn’t hold in the envisaged cases. Hence, f 
isn’t true at A, and my original assertion in U has to be retracted in A given (NIRRN). 
In what follows, I will argue that, promising as it looks, (NIRRN) is untenable if we accept 
certain views about tense and location, namely, what I will call temporalism and locoralism. 
I will then go on to show that (NIRRN) is impeccable if we don’t accept these views. We will 
thus arrive at our main conclusion, that one’s views on tense and location determine which 
form of relativism one should adopt. 
4.1. Temporalism and locoralism against (NIRRN) 
Consider the sentence “It is raining,” and let’s use r as a name for the proposition we assert 
when we literally use this sentence. Let’s now define temporalism as a view that entails the 
following: A circumstance of evaluation comprises a time, t, in addition to the already estab-
lished components, w and s, such that 
r is true relative to <w,s,t> iff, at w, it is raining at t. 
In maybe more familiar terms, temporalism says that r is a temporally neutral proposition, 
one that changes its truth-value depending on the time of evaluation (cf. Richard, 1981: 1). 
If we adopt temporalism, so understood, the non-indexical relativist will have to adapt her 
notion of truth relative to a context of use (which assumed that circumstances of evaluation 
just comprise a world and a taste standard). In particular, we will now get the following 
principle: 
A proposition p is true at a context of use, C, iff p is true relative to <w(C), s(C), t(C)>. 
Here, t(C) is the time of C, and everything else is as before. Applying this principle to our 
proposition r, we get that 
r is true at a context of use, C, iff, at the possible world of C, it is raining at the time 
of C. 
Assume temporalism so understood. Assume further that it is raining at a given point in 
time and that I concurrently assert, “It is raining.” It stops raining, and someone reminds me 
that I said it was raining. Unlike in the case of “tasty,” it would be odd to respond, 
“I take that back. It isn’t raining.” 
The appropriate response rather seems to be, 
“I stand by that. But it isn’t raining (anymore).” 
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According to (NIRRN), however, it should be the other way around: Let’s use A* to refer to 
the context where it has stopped raining and U* to refer to the context of my original asser-
tion. Let’s further continue to use r for the proposition I assert by my use of “It is raining.” r 
will fail to be true at A* because it isn’t raining at the time of A*. Given (NIRRN), this means 
that, in A*, I will have to retract my assertion in U* of r. 
A similar problem doesn’t arise for the assessment relativist. Even granting temporalism, 
the assessment relativist can adopt the following definition of truth relative to a context of 
use and assessment: 
A proposition p is true as used at a context, C1, and assessed from a context, C2, iff p 
is true relative to <w(C1), s(C2), t(C1)>. 
In other words, assessment relativists can assume that, while the taste standard is initial-
ized by the context of assessment, world and time are set by the context of use. We thus get 
that 
r is true as used at a context, C1, and assessed from a context, C2, iff, at the possible 
world of C1, it is raining at the time of C1. 
Given that, r will be true as used at U* and assessed from A* iff it is raining at the time of U*. 
This condition is satisfied, so even given (ARRN), no retraction is required when I find my-
self in A*. 
Similar points can be made with respect to location. Let’s say that locoralism is the view that 
adds a location to the circumstance of evaluation in the same way in which temporalists add 
a point in time (cf. Kaplan, 1989: 504). Given locoralism, (NIRRN) will make the problematic 
prediction that we may have to retract assertions of r just because we have moved to a dif-
ferent location. As before, the assessment relativist can avoid this commitment as long as 
she assumes that locations are provided by the context of use rather than the context of 
assessment.6 
(NIRRN) is untenable if we accept temporalism or locoralism as defined. A non-indexical 
relativist who subscribes to either of these positions will thus have to abandon (NIRRN) in 
favor of some other plausible principle that predicts retraction data in the domain of taste 
but not tense and location. It is far from obvious what this principle would be and, in any 
case, no such principle has been provided in the literature.7 So if we accept temporalism or 
locoralism, we have a strong case for assessment relativism. 
                                                             
6 One might think that a further problem arises for (NIRRN) if we assume that e.g. “My pants are on 
fire” can be used to assert a de se proposition that varies in truth-value with the speaker (cf. Lewis, 
1979). This is not the case, however. (ARRN) and (NIRRN) impose retraction requirements only on 
one’s own assertions. Thus, the speaker cannot relevantly vary. There will be an additional problem 
for (NIRRN), though, if, for instance, we think that the proposition asserted with e.g. “Your pants are 
on fire” varies in truth value with the addressee. This position should be added to the list of positions 
that make trouble for non-indexical relativism to the extent that it is deemed defensible. 
7 Some contextualists have provided candidate accounts of retraction data that are, in principle, com-
patible with non-indexical relativism (e.g. López de Sa, 2008; Plunkett and Sundell, 2013). But these 
accounts are designed to undermine the motivation for any form of relativism. So it would be self-
defeating for the non-indexical relativist to take them on board. Note also that it won’t do to assume 
domain specific norms of retraction e.g. one for tensed propositions tied to the original utterance 
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4.2. (NIRRN) without temporalism or locoralism 
What if we reject temporalism and locoralism? I contend that (NIRRN) is unproblematic 
under these conditions. To support this contention, let me disarm possible worries with 
(NIRRN) that arise independently of temporalism and locoralism. 
First, one might worry that (NIRRN) is incompatible with non-indexical relativism because 
it already entails assessment relativism. This is not the case, for (NIRRN) can be formulated 
with a notion of truth that is relativized only to contexts of use. And on my definitions—
following MacFarlane (2014: 60)—we cross the “philosophically interesting line” to assess-
ment relativism only if “we relativize truth not just to a context of use and an index, but also 
to a context of assessment.” 
One might object that this line has been crossed because, in (NIRRN), we evaluate the truth 
of p relative to C2, and C2 is a context of assessment. Note first though that C2 is also a 
context of use. MacFarlane (2014: 60) describes a context of use as “a possible situation in 
which a sentence might be used” and a context of assessment as “a possible situation in 
which a use of a sentence might be assessed.” Given that the assessment of a sentence plau-
sibly involves the use of another sentence, every context of assessment is also a context of 
use. In any case, it would be entirely unproblematic to just restrict the range of C1 and C2 in 
(NIRRN) to contexts of use in the sense defined. 
At best, then, (NIRRN) requires the relativization of truth to contexts of use that also happen 
to be contexts of assessment. This cannot suffice for assessment relativism though. After all, 
almost all contexts of use will also be contexts of assessment: when I can use a sentence, I 
can normally also use a sentence to assess a previous use of a sentence. Thus, on every the-
ory that relativizes truth to contexts of use, truth will sometimes be relativized to contexts 
of use that are also contexts of assessment.8 
Second, one might worry that (NIRRN) implausibly requires us to retract assertions made 
in relevantly different possible worlds. Assume that I assert that the earth is flat in a possible 
world, w, where the earth is flat. This proposition isn’t true at my actual context, where the 
earth isn’t flat. Thus, it has to be retracted by (NIRRN); which is implausible. Note, however, 
that (ARRN) already has this consequence. Just assume that I assert that the earth is flat in 
a possible world, w*, where the earth isn’t flat. This proposition isn’t true as used in the 
original context and assessed from the actual context. After all, the earth isn’t flat in w*. By 
(ARRN), the assertion has to be retracted. We can easily avoid these problems if we stipulate 
that C1 and C2 in (NIRRN) and (ARRN) must belong to the same possible world. 
                                                             
context and one for taste propositions tied to the context of assessment. After all, taste propositions 
can themselves be tensed. We would thus get contradictory requirements on whether to retract. 
8 Of course, there may be other ways of drawing the boundary between non-indexical and assessment 
relativism. Kölbel (2015), for instance, suggests that “the important dividing line is the one beyond 
which the normative status (i.e. as permissible or obligatory) of the use of a sentence is not absolute 
but depends on the situation in which its status is assessed.” One who accepts (NIRRN) would come 
out as an assessment relativist on this definition if we take requirements to retract as part of the 
“normative status” of an assertion. I think it is interesting in its own right to observe that Kölbel’s and 
MacFarlane’s definitions aren’t on a par. In fact, one way of reading the above considerations is as 
showing that Kölbel’s definition captures the spirit of assessment relativism better than MacFarlane’s 
own definition does. But this is not to say that MacFarlane fails to carve out an interesting position. 
It simply turns out that whether one should adopt this position depends less directly on retraction 
data than is standardly assumed; it also depends on issues regarding tense and location. 
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Third, one might worry that (NIRRN) fails to make sense of retraction. Leaving aside social, 
pragmatic or moral shortcomings, non-indexical relativists will say that an assertion that p 
is correct iff p is true at the context of the assertion (cf. MacFarlane, 2014: 101). (NIRRN) 
will thus entail that we sometimes have to retract correct assertions; namely, when our 
taste standard has relevantly shifted so that the asserted proposition is no longer true at 
our present context. This can seem puzzling. After all, isn’t it just obvious that one shouldn’t 
retract correct assertions? 
To respond, note once more that the very same problem arises with respect to (ARRN). For 
the assessment relativist, an assertion that p will be correct—modulo social, pragmatic or 
moral shortcomings—iff p is true as used and assessed from the context of the assertion (cf. 
MacFarlane, 2014: 103f). As before in the case of (NIRRN), the satisfaction of this condition 
doesn’t rule out a requirement to retract in a later context. So once more, we arrive at the 
conclusion that correct assertions have to be retracted sometimes. 
Maybe this means that we have to abandon both (NIRRN) and (ARRN) and that neither non-
indexical nor assessment relativism can properly accommodate retraction data. Strictly 
speaking, this would be unproblematic as far as the present article is concerned. My goal 
here is to elucidate how we can decide between non-indexical and assessment relativism if 
we want to subscribe to relativism of one variety or another. I don’t want to argue that we 
should, or plausibly can, subscribe to such a view at all. Still, some remarks might be in order 
to show that relativism is not a hopeless position. 
The force of the indicated worry with relativism will depend on just how obvious it is that 
we shouldn’t retract correct assertions. To me at least, this principle doesn’t seem obvious 
at all when we look at domains where relativism has been applied. In fact, these domains 
seem partially defined by the observation that assertions can seem correct even though 
there is an intuitive pull towards retraction after a relevant shift in the respective parameter 
(e.g. a shift in taste). That’s part of what makes these domains so puzzling. And that’s what 
relativism is supposed to capture by way of principles like (NIRRN) and (ARRN). 
One might want to rephrase the worry in light of this response. Ninan (2016: 445), for in-
stance, wonders, “why is it […] that one should retract an assertion that one was permitted 
to make in the first place?” He suggests that “[o]ften one retracts a past assertion so as not 
to continue to risk misleading the audience one was addressing at the time of the assertion.” 
Then he goes on to argue that relativists cannot plausibly employ this idea. But they can.  
Assume that, following non-indexical relativism, retraction is governed by (NIRRN). Sup-
pose now that I assert “Fish sticks are tasty.” My hearers will presumably infer that fish 
sticks are tasty by my present taste standard. For otherwise I shouldn’t have made the as-
sertion. Now suppose that even when the issue arises, I don’t retract the statement at a later 
occasion. Given (NIRRN), my hearers will infer that fish sticks must still be tasty relative to 
my now present taste standard. For otherwise I would have been required to retract by 
(NIRRN) and presumably would have done so. Suppose that, as a matter of fact, my taste 
standard has relevantly changed. Clearly then, my audience will be misled. So, pace Ninan, I 
should retract in order not to risk misleading my audience about my present taste standard. 
A completely analogous story could of course be told in terms of (ARRN).  
One might think that this just pushes back the question. Why is it that retraction is governed 
by (NIRRN) or (ARRN) respectively? But here we might have reached rock bottom at least 
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as far as philosophy is concerned. It might be that we can offer a deeper explanation of why 
these norms hold in terms of e.g. the nature of retraction (cf. e.g. MacFarlane, 2011: 89 for 
how one might derive norms of assertion from the idea that assertion is a proposal to update 
the common ground). It might also be though that the norms already constitute the nature 
of retraction so that no deeper explanation is to be had (cf. MacFarlane, 2011: 87f for dis-
cussion of such a view). In any case, this issue goes beyond the scope of this article. 
Note here that (NIRRN) and (ARRN) seem pretty economical. One needs to assert only once 
that e.g. fish sticks are tasty. From then on, people can assume that one likes them even if 
one doesn’t constantly reassert what one asserted already. This economy comes at the cost 
that one will have to retract the assertion once one’s taste standard shifts. But this seems 
easily bearable given that such shifts are rare. In a sense then, it seems quite reasonable to 
have a language with a relativistic design. 
In sum, (NIRRN) seems unproblematic if we reject temporalism and locoralism. So if we 
reject these views, retraction data will be unproblematic for the non-indexical relativist. In 
the absence of other reasons to prefer assessment over non-indexical relativism, we should 
stick with the latter view simply because it’s simpler. 
5. Conclusion 
We have seen that whether we accept temporalism or locoralism should determine whether 
we accept non-indexical or assessment relativism. If we reject temporalism and locoralism, 
we should stick with non-indexical relativism. For (NIRRN) makes perfect sense of retrac-
tion data and there is thus no need to adopt the more complicated assessment relativist 
framework. If we accept temporalism or locoralism, then we should go for assessment rel-
ativism. For (NIRRN) becomes untenable and there is no obvious alternative retraction 
norm a non-indexical relativist could adopt.  
Should we accept temporalism or locoralism? I won’t take a stand on this here, just let me 
note one thing. Rejecting temporalism and locoralism as defined doesn’t amount to rejecting 
temporally and locationally neutral propositions across the board. We just have to deny that 
these propositions feature as the objects of assertion. This leaves open the possibility that 
they play an important role e.g. as inputs to a compositional semantics. 
What should we do if we are undecided whether temporalism or locoralism holds? There’s 
a methodological choice to be made. Either we go for assessment relativism in order to be 
safe. Assessment relativism properly accounts for retraction data even if temporalism and 
locoralism turn out to be true. Or we go for non-indexical relativism because we don’t want 
to complicate our theory unless we are forced to. We can have it either safe or simple. I tend 
to side with the latter approach, but both strategies seem acceptable.  
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